



Enemy in the Forests: Narratives and Fires in the Pacific Northwest 
 
Narrative has long been an important part of forest ecology and management.1 Indeed, 
Dr. Charles Cowan, Chief Fire Warden of the Washington Forest Fire Association (WFFA) 
famed for his career in fire prevention in Washington, capitalized on and perpetuated the use of 
fire narrative in his 1961 book, The Enemy is Fire!, a history of forest fires and fire prevention.2 
The Enemy is Fire! depicts a history of fire “holocausts” raging across the West, devastating 
pristine forests and lumber. According to Cowan, private land and timber owners sacrificed their 
own money and capital to ward off the demon fires and save the forests of the Northwest. In 
Cowan's book introduction, the president of WFFA, Garrett Eddy, predicted that “The enemy 
will still be fire for the next fifty years and beyond.”3 By constructing fire as an enemy, a force 
responsible for holocausts, and as a destructor of pristine places and natural resources, these 
prominent foresters were branching far beyond wildland fire policies and management: they 
were waging a discursive war against fire.  Cowan and Eddy, like hundreds of others, generated 
powerful rhetoric and narratives to portray forest fires as the evil villain, simultaneously 
representing foresters and timber companies as victims in need of protection from a wild 
aggressor, the fire enemy. 
Narrative still dominates the way historians, ecologists, forest managers, and journalists 
discuss fire. However, Eddy was wrong in predicting that the fire-enemy narrative would remain 
the governing paradigm for “fifty years and beyond.” The following year after the publication of 
the book, in 1962, the Tall Timber’s Research Station held its first fire ecology conference, 
marking the beginning of mainstream scientific skepticism of the exclusion of fire from forests.4 
Today, most recognize that fire is an important part of forest ecology. They thus maintain that 
Cowan's 1962 belief of the "fire enemy" was misplaced, and the decades of forest suppression 
policies such contemporary thinking fostered disrupted the natural fire cycles in forests and 
caused the proliferation of flammable fuels that only led to larger and more frequent fires.5 The 
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naturalist and journalist Ted Williams paints a strong picture of the current narrative around 
forest fires: “Smokey, like Pooh, is a bear of very little brain…Smokey never stopped swinging 
his shovel long enough to perceive that, along with flames, he was extinguishing ecosystems.”6  
Most present-day explanations of fire suppression echo Williams, pointing to Smokey 
Bear as a symbol of the naïve forester who misunderstood fire ecology. This association began in 
the early 1970s, soon after fire suppression came into question. A 1972 Wall Street Journal bore 
the front page headline: “For Shame, Smokey! Why Are You Setting That Forest Fire?: Actually, 
Rangers & Ecologists Now Say, an Occasional Fire May Do Animals, Trees, Good.”7 In 2012 
NPR had a series on the increase in “megafires” in the Southwest with one report on the 
“Smokey Bear effect,” interviewing ecologist Thomas Stewman and fire historian Stephen Pyne. 
The reporter explained the “Smokey Bear effect” as the fire suppression policy and science 
behind it, claiming that “it was the experts who approved the all-out ban on fires in the 
Southwest. They got it wrong.”8 Numerous other scholarly works echo this trend invoking 
Smokey Bear as the naïve forester. Despite the frequent mention of Smokey, relatively few 
studies contextualize the relation between fire prevention campaigns and fire suppression.9  
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Considering the socio-ecological and retrospective nature of this discourse, Smokey Bear 
and fire prevention campaigns should be of particular interest to environmental historians. As 
William Cronon writes, environmental historians are tasked with writing “stories about stories 
about nature,” and contained within the contemporary explanation of Smokey Bear and fire 
suppression are both layers of stories.10 To avoid ambiguity, I will call the “stories about nature,” 
environmental narratives and the “stories about stories,” historical narratives. The 
environmental narrative in the contemporary Smokey Bear discourse tells a story about the 
state’s relation to fire. The line of rhetoric that “Smokey the Bear was wrong all along” suggests 
that the USFS naively suppressed fires because of a misunderstanding of forest ecology and 
political inertia from conservation ideology. This narrative parallels what sociologist Mark 
Hudson terms the “state-centric” history from fire historians such as Stephen Pyne and Nancy 
Langston. Hudson demonstrates that throughout its history the USFS, while certainly not 
monolithic or static, pursued the primary goal of maintaining production of timber capital. 
Rather than backing their policy with the best science of the time, Hudson explains, the USFS 
suppressed alternative viewpoints from ecologists and managers as vehemently as they 
suppressed forest fires.11  
The historical narrative embedded in the Smokey Bear discourse tells a story about the 
relation of fire prevention campaigns to forest management and the public, suggesting that the 
icon advocated for fire suppression and convinced the public that fires existed outside the natural 
state of forests. The problem is that Smokey Bear was only one piece in the history of fire 
prevention and suppression that began fifty years before his birth in XX year and involved a 
network of state, federal, public, and private organizations. The widespread appropriation of 
Smokey as an icon to discuss forestry in the 20th century implies a call for a discussion of the 
history of fire discourse. This paper fulfills the need for a larger historical analysis of the fire-
enemy narrative in the United States, with particular attention to the characters it portrayed and 
the actors who produced it. The shift in the analysis of fire history from the policy and ecology 
orientation to the environmental narrative and discourse perspectives presented in this paper 
opens up not only a new way to understand fire history, but also demonstrates the importance of 
environmental histories that focus on images, propaganda, and public-oriented environmental 
materials. It is, after all, these discursive objects that generate the narratives undergirding 
environmental policies.  
I seek to provide a more holistic understanding of the environmental narrative around fire 
during the suppression era by deconstructing the discourse around fire prevention in the Pacific 
Northwest from World War II through the early 1960s, the golden—or rather, green—age of fire 
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prevention campaigns. The paper is divided into three sections. First it provides the historical 
context of political and social history in which the discourse emerged to show the roots of the 
fire-enemy narrative in the pre-war period. Second, it examines fire narratives during the war by 
tracing the actors involved in the origins and administration of three fire prevention campaigns: 
Keep Green, the American Forest Products Industries Inc. (AFPI), and the Cooperative Forest 
Fire Prevention Program (CFFP), demonstrating the substantial role the timber industry and fire 
suppression advocates in the USFS played. These organizations “othered” fire during the war. 
Third, the paper shows how the narrative continued after the war into the 1960s, when Cowan 
wrote The Enemy is Fire!, and the way in which the organizations founded during WWII used 
national defense discourse and “othering” of fire to promote private industry. In all, this paper 
demonstrates that fire-prevention publicity campaigns supported not only the fire-enemy 
narrative but also the capitalist pursuits of private land owners, timber companies, and anti-
regulation bureaucrats within the USFS.  
This case focuses on the Pacific Northwest and primarily Oregon because of the role of 
the timber industry in this region and because the Keep Oregon Green (KOG) and Keep 
Washington Green (KWG) associations that emerged in the early years of the second world war 
became models for similar state fire prevention campaigns across the country. I draw on records 
of organized public relations campaigns like Keep Oregon Green in addition to general media 
such as newspaper articles to understand how actors such as timber representatives, politicians, 
and journalists constructed the fire enemy narrative in the Northwest. However, because the 
USFS and many propaganda associations operated on the federal level, sources and details 
analyzed here could be expanded to discuss trends in fire discourse and the fire enemy narrative 
more broadly across the United States.  
 
Conservationism and Context 
 
A history of fire discourse necessitates an explanation of the political and economic 
context in which the discourse emerged. The United States Forest Service (USFS) established in 
1905, quickly claimed full responsibility of fire management after the “Big Blowup” in 1910. 
The Big Burn, one of the most famous forest fires in American history, swept through the 
Northwest in Washington, Idaho, and Montana, making national headlines throughout the 
season. The fire left a toll on the old growth forests and economy of the American west, but an 
even more lasting legacy on ideology, burning deeply into the hearts of men like Gifford Pinchot 
and William Greeley who dedicated their lives to the conservation of the American wilderness. 12 
That year, Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief of the USFS, wrote that one of the principles of 
conserving forests was the prevention of wastes. This principle entailed a conception of fires that 
understood them to exist outside the natural state of forests: “It was assumed," Pinchot wrote, 
that forest fires "came in the natural order of things, as inevitably as the seasons or the rising and 
setting of the sun. Today we understand that forest fires are wholly within the control of men.”13 
To Pinchot, the belief that fires were in the “natural order of things” was a primitive and archaic 
idea. To ensure the everyone understood that forests were supposed to be fireless, Pinchot called 
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for a public education campaign: “In all these matters of waste of natural resources, the 
education of the people to understand that they can stop the leakage comes before the actual 
stopping and after the means of stopping it have long been ready at our hands.”14 
William Greeley, who later became Chief of the Forest Service from 1920-1928, declared 
after the 1910 Big Burn, “from that time forward, smoke in the woods has been my yardstick of 
the progress in American forestry.”15 The fire suppression policy reached its apotheosis in the 
1930s after a series of large fires, most notably the Tillamook Burn in northwest Oregon. After 
this, the USFS adopted the “10 AM policy,” mandating forest fire fighters control fires by 10 
A.M. the day after they began. This policy persisted through into the 1970s.16 While prolific and 
homogenously adopted across the country, the fire suppression policy was not the only strategy 
that foresters conceived as different management paradigms would cycle in and out of popular 
discourse amongst foresters. One was the possibility of using light or prescribed burning, the 
practice of purposefully starting fires for various reasons such as clearing brush or reducing fuel 
for future fires. Advocates ranged from ranchers to scientists and public foresters.17 Of course 
indigenous forestry among numerous Northwest nations involved using fire to shape landscapes 
for cultivation, defense, and other purposes.18 But when it came to US government policy as 
reflected in the USFS, fire suppression was the dominant approach to wildland fire management 
from the time of the Big Blowup until the late twentieth century, and thus the light-burning 
advocates were always fighting an up-hill battle. 
In addition to the prescription-suppression debate, from the inception of the USFS until 
the late 1940s, a battle waged over the how the state was to govern the timber industry. On one 
side in the early years, Gifford Pinchot—the first Chief of the Forest Service, 1905-1910—and 
other politicians sought to regulate private timber and maintain state control of forestry, 
convinced that the forests were to be, in the words of Pinchot, “developed and preserved for the 
benefit of the many, and not merely for the profit of a few.”19 Their opponents, such as Greeley 
advocated a doctrine of “cooperation not regulation,” whereby private industry and the USFS 
would work together to manage American forestry. This ideology developed legislation such as 
the Weeks Act of 1911 and the 1924 Clark-McNary Act establishing that the timber industry and 
USFS would cooperate to suppress fire—and thus protect timber capital. Ultimately Greeley and 
his timber allies won the fight, and regulation of private forestry remained in the domain of state 
government, if it existed at all. Before WWII, only five states had passed forest conservation 
regulation, and by 1945, only twelve. The legislation In Oregon, Washington, and California, the 
timber industry had written and lobbied for the regulating legislation as a means of preventing 
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more overbearing regulation. State legislation primarily focused on fires and regeneration of 
forests rather than timber cuts.20  
 
During debates over the possibility of light burning as a method of fuel reduction, those 
opposed to this policy developed fire as an enemy with racialized discourse. Drawing from John 
Wesley Powell’s description of Paiute Indians in the southwest using fire to manage forests and 
brush, the opposition criticized light-burning advocates of proposing “Paiute forestry.”21 Greeley 
wrote in 1920 in an article for The Timberman entitled, “‘Piute [sic] Forestry’ or the Fallacy of 
Light Burning.” He asserted that light burning supporters were advocating for the practices of the 
“noble redskin” who “fired the forests regularly, not so much to facilitate his hunting or protect 
his dwelling as because his nature lore taught him that this was the way to prevent ‘big’ forest 
fire [sic].”22 Greely was trying to disassociate light burning advocates from reasonable forestry, 
and frame fire and prescribed burning as the primitive opposite of “civilized,” Euro-American 
forest science.  
 
[Figure 1] Udo J. Keppler's 1909 depiction of a muscular Gifford Pinchot rushing in alone to 
fight the fire representing “greed” in the form of timber grabs, land grafts. The caption reads 
“Who’ll stand by him? The Chief Forester and the consuming element.” The image appeared in 
the 1909 Puck Magazine. Credit: Udo J. Keppler, Who'll stand by him? / Keppler. N.Y.: 
Published by Keppler & Schwarzmann, Puck Building, 1909. Image. Retrieved from the Library 
of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2011647504/. (Accessed June 14, 2016.) 
 
 Importantly, the discourse perpetuated in Cowan’s 1961 The Enemy is Fire! with the 
timber industry as the hero was not the only way people conceived of fires in the twentieth 
century. The above comic (Figure 1) uses fire for an entirely different metaphor. Pinchot nobly 
confronts both fire and the greed of profit-driven forestry alone. Indeed, Pinchot’s second 
principle of conservation was the “prevention of waste” through fire exclusion as well as 
discouraging devastation of forests through greedy extraction practices.23 The use of “waste” 
was equally critical of the forestry paradigm that “looked upon the forest as a mine rather than as 
a farm,” in the words of Thornton Munger, director of the Pacific Northwest Forest Experiment 
Station, in 1934.24 
 Other fire-enemy narratives were emerging from other groups beyond the USFS in the 
pre-WW II era. The Western Forestry and Conservation Association (WFCA), one of the first 
fire prevention organizations gaining publicity in the aftermath of the 1910 “Big Burn” was a 
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made up of collection of private timber representatives. They began the slogan “Keep Them 
Green” in the Northwest, which the Keep Oregon Green and Keep Washington Green 
Associations then appropriated decades later.25 The American Forestry Association also began to 
push for fire prevention public awareness in the late 1930s. They dedicated an issue of their 
magazine, American Forests, to fire in 1939 and published posters with slogans such as “Your 
forests, your fault, your loss.” The editor of American Forests wrote, “forest fires once started 
are fought like wars—on the firing line. And as with wars, forest fires are prevented by a vibrant 
public will to prevent them.”26 The real war would provide the opportunity to engage the vibrant 
public will even more. 
Discursively, fire suppression advocates in the USFS and the timber industry had the 
monumental task of proving that fire—a phenomenon that occurred even without human 
interference and that indigenous people had used for centuries prior to Euro-American forestry—
was unnatural, while its exclusion was the natural state of the forest. They started achieving this 
by generating fire-enemy discourse that vilified blazes as external and foreign to forests. They 
thus constructed a definition of forests as inherently fireless environments. Fires were no longer 
naturally occurring in their view but rather became the culpability and responsibility of people. 
  
National Defense and Fire Prevention Campaigns 
 
World War II influenced fire-enemy discourse in several ways. First, the war stimulated 
development of large fire prevention public awareness campaigns that helped carry the discourse 
from the realm of political rhetoric into the public interface and cultural vernacular. Four 
organizations were particularly active and effective during WW II in producing far-reaching 
rhetoric and public relations campaigns to vilify forest fires: Keep Oregon Green (KOG), Keep 
Washington Green (KWG), the Cooperative Forest Fire Prevention Program (CFFP), and the 
American Forest Products Industries Inc. (AFPI).  
Second, the war offered “national defense” as a powerful, legitimate, and compelling 
aspect of fire-suppression rhetoric and imagery. In 1942, a Japanese submarine shelled a 
California oil field near Los Padres National Forest. The proximity to the forest incited fear in 
the USFS and military as wood products were essential to the wartime economy. To protect 
lumber for the war, the USFS organized the Cooperative Forest Fire Prevention Campaign 
(CFFP). The already established Wartime Advertising Council took the CFFP under its wing to 
produce posters and advertisements warning the public against the risk of forest fires.27  Linking 
national defense and forest fire prevention allowed advocates to construct forest fighting 
narratives under the banner of patriotism and national security.  And at times, they quite overtly 
racialized forests and enemy fires. In the process, the new WW II fire discourse simultaneously 
maligned forest fires and supported the timber industry and private landowners.  
 
Fire prevention campaigns emerged through publicity campaigns from various industries 
to discourage heavy regulation and promote free enterprise common in the mid-twentieth 
century. These campaigns, rather than selling specific products, sought to improve corporate 
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images.28 For the timber industry, this included the development of “tree farm” programs that 
demonstrated to the public that the industry cared about the regrowth of forests.29 The National 
Lumber Manufacturers’ Association (NLMA) launched the AFPI in 1932 as a trade promotion 
subsidiary program, and in 1941, the AFPI began its propaganda campaign to promote private 
forestry over strong federal oversight and regulation. William Greeley headed the organization 
and it vehemently fought increased regulation from the USFS throughout the 1940s with the 
NLMA vowing a “full blast against any and all attempts to promote federal regulation.”30 Fire 
propaganda became a key WW II mechanism for NMLA, AFPI, and other organizations to 
support their explicit goal of protecting timber capital.  
Out of World War II emerged a network of quasi-government, state level Keep Green 
organizations. From the start, the timber industry and fire suppression advocates played a heavy 
role in the Keep Green movements in the Northwest. KWG was the first of these two 
associations beginning in the 1940 fire season and securing its renewal 1941. William Greeley, 
the notorious and influential fire suppression advocate, and Washington Governor Clarence 
Martin spearheaded the beginning of the program.31 Owners of the large timber companies such 
as Phil Weyerhaeuser and Kris Kreienbaum; Cordyn Wagner, president of the West Coast 
Lumberman’s association; and fire suppression advocate Charles Cowan all assisted in 
cofounding KWG. Keep Oregon Green began a few months later in the summer of 1941 with the 
efforts of Governor Charles Sprague. In 1941, he called a meeting of more than 250 foresters, 
state leaders, and timber owners to solidify the association.32 In addition to its origins, the 
administration of KOG reveals the institutional ties to the timber industry. KOG was supposedly 
a quasi-state organization with support and representatives from the USFS and state foresters, as 
well as private interests. While the association’s by-laws stated, “representatives shall be a 
balance of the major forestry and agricultural interests and the general public, all to be selected 
by a majority vote of the members of the corporation,”33 neither the public nor agricultural 
interests ever matched the overwhelming majority of timber representatives. The Board of 
Trustees in 1948, for example, had twelve foresters and timber industry representatives, 
compared with two representatives from agriculture. Furthermore, various businesses in the 
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forest products and timber industry were the largest contributors to the association.34 Thus, 
KOG—which became one of the model fire prevention organizations—institutionally 
represented private foresters from the start.  
 
[Figure 2] Caption reads: “Watch that campfire. Every forest fire is an Axis fire. Always build 
your campfire in a designated place where it will not spread and BE SURE it is completely out 
before leaving it—even for a short time.” Image is part of a series of similar ads associating fire 
with the Axis and encouraging the layman to prevent fire. Credit: Keep Oregon Green 
Association, "Watch That Campfire," Heppner Gazette Times, 2 July  1942. Retrieved from 
Oregon Historical Newspapers. (Accessed 28 February 2016). 
 
 
 Soon after US involvement in WWII, foresters and politicians shifted fire-enemy 
discourse to themes of national defense. Figure 2, a KOG advertisement appearing in Heppner 
Gazette Times, articulates this with the slogan, “forest defense is national defense.” 35 The image 
goes on to proclaim that every fire is an Axis fire, thereby directly relating forest fires to WW II 
and the enemies in Germany and Japan.  Further, the image creates a personal connection to 
viewers by focusing on campfires, thereby connecting to everyday people who use and visit 
forests, a family pastime and personal link for viewers. Also, the image puts the blame for forests 
and prevention firmly on people, not the USFS, not building practices or land development, and 
not timber industries who are conspicuously absent from the image. The image thus helps 
discursively label fires as WW II enemies created by careless campers. 
In 1942, Governor Sprague wrote an article on KOG in the Oregon State University 
(OSU) Forestry School’s student journal, The Annual Cruise.36 Here he explained the motive 
behind the continuation and expansion of KOG, “Every person in 1942 must resolve and 
remember to use care in the woods; he must keep his eyes and ears open for evidences of enemy 
action in his community; he must aid in organizing forces of forest protection; and if his physical 
condition permits, it is not unlikely that he may be called upon to help fight fire in field or forest. 
Certainly he must be ready.”37 This call to arms reads more like a call to build tanks or join the 
army than a call to put out campfires. Fire prevention was not limited to only properly disposing 
of cigarettes; the men of Oregon also had to watch for signs of enemy sabotage. Eugene R. 
Manock, an associate of the Oregon State University School of Forestry articulated this fear in a 
1942 article appearing in Oregon State University College of Forestry’s annual magazine 
publication. He stressed the threat of attack through firebombing forests, writing that “from the 
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enemy point of view it would be wise indeed for them to set fire to these enormous timberlands, 
thus transforming them into a vast economic desert waste.”38 Manock’s paranoia that an attack 
would render forests an “economic desert waste” demonstrates the construction of fear around 
forest vulnerability as joint economic, political, and environmental devastation. 
 
 [Figure 3] Title reads: “Forest Defense is National Defense.” The bottom of the image provides 
examples of how civilians could help prevent fires. Credit: Unknown artist, "Forest Defense is 
National Defense," World War II Poster Collection,  (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State 
University Libraries Special Collections & Archives Research Center).  
 
[Figure 4] Caption reads: “Our Carelessness - Their Secret Weapon – Prevent Forest Fires.” 
“U.S. Forest Service” appears in the bottom left corner. This image is one of the most iconic fire 
prevention posters of the era. Credit: Unknown artist, "Our Carelessness - Their Secret Weapon," 
World War II Poster Collection,  (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Libraries Special 
Collections & Archives Research Center). 
 
[Figure 5] Caption reads: “Careless Matches—Weapons of Sabotage…Prevent Forest Fires.” 
The figures from Figure 4 appear in the bottom right corner suggesting that the Figure 4 poster 
would be widely recognizable. Credit: Unknown artist, "Careless Matches—Weapons of 
Sabotage," World War II Poster Collection,  (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University 
Libraries Special Collections & Archives Research Center). 
 
The wartime propaganda identified fire as a weapon of the clearly defined and evil 
enemy: The Axis. Figure 2 contains one of KOG’s favorite slogans of the time, “every forest fire 
is an Axis fire.”39 This suggested that the Axis were the perpetrators and the beneficiaries of 
forest fires in the US.  If the Axis were the antithesis to American values, then forest fires in 
these kinds of depictions became the antithesis to forests—and also to the American public and 
US interests. Figure 3 is one of the most iconic fire prevention posters from WWII.40 Hitler and 
the racist caricature of Emperor Hirohito, illuminated by the orange glow of the forest fire, taunt 
the audience with malicious glares. 41 Hirohito, in the forefront, glances to the side with a 
conniving expression. Here the imagery racializes forest fires, capitalizing on fears of 
treacherous Japanese invading the United States and causing harm.  This was, after all, the time 
of Japanese internment camps. Figure 5 carries the same figures in the bottom right corner 
suggesting that the image would be familiar to the general audience. The slogans, “our 
carelessness: their secret weapon,” and “careless matches: weapons of sabotage,” reflect a new 
manner of explicitly identifying forest fires as weapons of warfare to be aimed by a racially 
distinct and caricatured Axis Powers leaders against US forests and the country's security. Use of 
                                                 
38 Eugene R. Manock, “War and the Pacific Forests,” The Annual Cruise, 1942. Retrieved from 
Oregon Digital. (Accessed 15 March 2016).  
39 Keep Oregon Green Association, “Watch That Campfire.”  
40 As suggested by frequent reference in various texts. Pyne, Fire in America. A Cultural History 
of Wildland and Rural Fire, 176. Hudson, Fire Management in the American West : Forest 
Politics and the Rise of Megafires, 27. 
41 Unknown artist, "Our Carelessness—Their Secret Weapon," World War II Poster Collection, 
Oregon State University Archives, folder 8, item 20.   
11 
the word "sabotage" also suggests an act of terrorism, criminal behavior, and an upsetting of 
standard practices. 42  The claim thus normalized the absence of fire in forests. Moreover, rather 
than a predator or agent in its own right, fire had become a weapon to a force that was inarguably 
the enemy. The move from agent to weapon strengthened fire exclusion by shifting from the 
realm of a metaphorical enemy to a (perceived) material threat.  
 
[Figure 6] Caption reads: Careless matches aid the Axis – Prevent Forest Fires!” Appeared in 
newspaper ads without credit. Credit: “Careless Matches Aid the Axis,” Heppner Gazette Times, 
6 August 1942. Retrieved from Oregon Historical Newspapers. Accessed 28 February 2016. 
 
[Figure 7] Caption reads: “Stop and get your free fag bag – careless matches aid the Axis.” The 
USFS logo appears above the word “Axis.” Credit: Louis Hirshman, Stop and Get Your Free 
Fag Bag Careless Matches Aid the Axis., [Pennsylvania: wpa war services project, between 1941 
and 1943]  
Retrieved from Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3b49005/. (Accessed 15 
March 2016). 
 
Importantly, the racist cartoon of an ambiguous Japanese figure—possibly intended to be 
Hirohito in some cases—seems to have appeared more frequently than Hitler, whom I only 
found on the one poster. In this way, the propaganda depicted the fires as racial enemies. In 
Figure 6, the man’s face glows from the match, revealing his malicious grin before he 
undoubtedly uses it to set the forests aflame. 43 Figure 7 depicts another man with predatory 
features concealed behind a tree preparing his sadistic arson as the rising sun looms behind. 44 
These images play on the racism perpetrated against Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the US 
during the war. The ideological exclusion of Japanese Americans from America necessitated, it 
was believed, the actual exclusion into internment camps to prevent sabotage. Similarly, the 
ideological exclusion of fire from forests necessitated fire suppression. Further, the posters 
suggest the unintentional arsonist, who left a campfire or threw a cigarette out the window, was 
using the enemy’s weapon and colluding with the Axis power, a threat to national security, 
American values, and the supposed whiteness of the United States. Anyone starting a forest fire, 
according to these posters, was not loyal to the American war effort.  
Fire enemy discourse declined towards the end of the war. Released in 1942, the movie 
Bambi provided a new anthropomorphism to the forests with cute animals as the protagonists and 
a climax that involved the characters fleeing from a fire. The CFFP, in 1944, replaced the Axis 
figures with Bambi, most likely because of the war propaganda about fires was dark and 
inaccessible to children.45 The lovable fawn, with Disney donating the rights in 1944, pranced 
                                                 
42 Unknown artist, "Careless Matches—Weapons of Sabotage," World War II Poster Collection, 
Oregon State University Archives, folder 13, item 8.  
43 “Careless Matches Aid the Axis,” Heppner Gazette Times, 6 August 1942. Retrieved from 
Oregon Historical Newspapers. Accessed 28 February 2016. 
44 Louis Hirshman, Stop and Get Your Free Fag Bag Careless Matches Aid the Axis., 
[Pennsylvania: WPA war services project, between 1941 and 1943]  
Retrieved from Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3b49005/. (Accessed 15 
March 2016).  
45 Pyne, Fire in America. A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire, 176. 
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across the country asking “please mister, don’t be careless.”46 Because Bambi was only loaned 
for a year in 1944, the CFFP and Wartime Advertising Council commissioned Albert Staehle to 
design a character to embody the message of fire prevention. In 1945, just before the end of the 
war, Smokey Bear made his first appearance and has since become one of the most recognizable 
icons in the American cultural vernacular. In sum, the war provided a catalyst to fire prevention 
efforts that sparked highly organized national and regional propaganda campaigns. KOG and 
CFFP frequently associated fire with the war effort and often racialized their imagery and 
discourse. These awareness campaigns established fire indisputably as the enemy and placed 
immense responsibility on the public to watch for “sabotage” against the forests. Importantly, the 
timber and wood products industries backed these organizations, and the war came at a crucial 
point in the debate over regulation. Where before waste from fire and cutting were conflated—as 
demonstrated in figure 1—the institutions that controlled the public discourse on fire had a stake 
in separating these factors and emphasizing fire alone.  
Smokey’s domination of the contemporary discourse on fire overshadows the manner in 
which KOG and AFPI, in addition to CFFP, perpetuated the fire-enemy narrative and developed 
an understanding of forests and fires that served private interests. For one, the presence of 
Smokey Bear in Oregon, Washington and elsewhere was largely because of sponsorship from 
respective Keep Green organizations.47 The Keep Green which began in Oregon and Washington 
at the beginning of the war, had reached 23 forested states by 1948.48 A major piece of Keep 
Oregon Green was their youth branch, the Green Guards. The Green Guards ran parallel to boy 
scouts and girl scouts, but unlike other youth organizations, there was no hierarchical system. 
Upon joining, the children would receive a tool kit for spreading the message of fire prevention 
including a handbook, stickers, and posters. Upon first advertising the program in 1942, KOG 
immediately received 20,000 applications. By 1949, they had 50,000 children registered. Leaders 
took pride in the number of the Green Guards who went on to fight fires in suppression crews or 
attend forestry school.49 They rarely had to budget for radio or television advertisement slots, as 
these channels would often grant them time free of cost.50 In 1949, thirty-seven radio stations 
were broadcasting KOG ads.51 Similarly, AFPI managed to disseminate its message by reaching 
to the network of wood products and timber companies that supported it. The organization would 
simply produce ad mats, and companies would pay for the spot in newspapers, plastering their 
name across the bottom. The 1956 version proudly declared that the ads would be distributed to 
                                                 
46 Ellen Earnhardt Morrison, Guardian of the Forest: A History of the Smokey Bear Program 
(Morielle Press, 1989), 6–7.  
47 Unknown author, “Fair Exhibit Attracts Record Breaking Crowd,” Forest Log, (Salem, 
Oregon), 1954. Retrieved from foresthistory.org. (Accessed 12 June 2016); Unknown author, 
“Two Governors and Smokey Bear Urge Continuing Care with Fire,” Western Forest Industries 
Review, 1953.  
48 “History of Keep America Green,” in KOG Records at UO, Box 1.  
49 Arthur Priaulx, “The Story of Keep Oregon Green,” presented to Society of American 
Foresters, Seattle Washington, 12 October 1949. KOG Records at OSU, p. 12.  
50 There are various letters thanking radio and television stations in KOG Records at UO and 
KOG Records as OSU. For example: Albert Weisendanger, “Albert Weisendanger to All Oregon 
Radio Stations,” 22 May 1951, KOG Records at OSU.  
51 Arthur Priaulx, "The Story of Keep Oregon Green," KOG Records at UO, Box 1.  
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11,000 newspapers across the county.52 Thus, both KOG and AFPI maintained immense success 




Soon after the war, AFPI newspaper advertisements declared that “fighting fire is a war 
that never ends!” Such a claim—and many others like it—became cemented after WW II.  But 
while these fire-prevention campaigns galvanized a fire-enemy discourse, they also advocated 
for timber capital as much as they demonized fire. They thus built an understanding of forests as 
a place for timber capital.  
 
[Figure 8] Caption reads: “One Red Menace You Can Control.” Credit: American Forest 
Products Industries Inc., “One Red Menace You Can Control,” Heppner Gazette Times, 13 
August 1950. Retrieved from Oregon Digital. (Accessed 15 March 2016). The draft of the ad 
appears in: These Free Ad Mats Can Help Keep Your State Green, booklet, KOG Records at UO, 
Box 1. 
 
In the post-war period, fire morphed from a weapon aimed at the country by Axis 
enemies to a different kind of threat. As Ben Lampman from the Oregonian put it in a KOG-
commissioned piece about the danger of forest fires: “For flame, though a good servant, is a 
cruel master—and were the flame to possess their forests, little would be left of the past or 
present, alike dear to the Green Land, and little would remain for the future.”53 Fire was now a 
“cruel master” and an agent in its own right, rather than just a weapon. Fire suppression 
discourse was also by the late 1940s portraying fire as a communist, foreign threat to the United 
States. During the McCarthy Era, bold articles like “Red Destroyer,” and “300 Fires Roar 
Redly,” stood out boldly in newspapers such as the Oregonian, while other headlines using 
“reds” usually referred to the Soviet Union.54 Figure 8 draws the link more explicitly with the 
slogan, “One red menace you can control," which perpetuated the racialized forest fire threat.  
That same ad also continued to link national defense and American success to forests without 
fire.  Moreover, the explanation in Figure 8 outlined the many ways forests contributed not only 
to the US military through aircraft carriers and weapons, but also to national economic 
development given the capacity of forests to generate a tremendous range of products. American 
Forest Products Industries Inc. and Keep Oregon Green cosponsored this ad in the 1950s.55 One 
reader wrote a letter to the editor claiming, “while we are spending billions of dollars to contain a 
red menace abroad, we are neglecting a red menace at home that is devastating our country like a 
sadistic invading army—namely, forest fires.”56 To a reader of Oregon newspapers at this time, 
it would appear that communism spread like wildfire and wildfire spread like communism. Like 
                                                 
52 American Forest Products Industries Inc., 1956 Proof Book of Forestry Ad Maps, KOG 
Records at UO, Box 1.  
53 Ben Lampan, “The Wardens of the Green Land,” KOG Records at UO, Box 1.  
54 The Oregonian, “Red Destroyer,” The Oregonian, June 29, 1952. The Oregonian, “300 Fires 
Foar Redly in Oregon,” The Oregonian, September 7, 1955, sec. 1. 
55 American Forest Products Industries Inc., “One Red Menace You Can Control,” Heppner 
Gazette Times, 13 August 1950.   
56 H. P. Lee, “Dowsing Fires,” Oregonian, 14 August 1949.  
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with the allusions to the Axis during WWII, fire was again a foreign, invasive threat, but this 
time a threat that acted upon its own will. 
 In the post-war period, fire prevention campaigns revealed that the perceived need to 
exclude fire and protect forests was equally a need to protect timber capital. This is best 
articulated in a KOG document on the history of the movement: “The basic idea of Keep 
America Green is nothing new in the annals of forest fire prevention. It’s an old idea in a new 
container. Ever since man has been trying to extract timber for profit, he has waged an incessant 
war against fire in his woodlands.”57 Fires did not belong in forests, but timber extraction for 
profit did. A radio fill declared, “The expression ‘mighty forests’ is very fitting for our irrigation, 
navigation, and many vital industries depend wholly or in part on our forested hills. ‘Keep 
Oregon Green’ is more than a slogan—it’s an economic law!”58 In Spring of 1949, Dean of the 
OSU Forestry School Paul Dunn wrote to Oregon Secretary of State, Earl Newbry on behalf of 
the KOG Executive Committee explaining the importance of the organization. He wrote, 
“Oregon has many unique attributes as a state: her rich farm and ranches, her mountains and 
lakes and valleys. But, all those natural and man-made attractions, as great as they are, still pale 
into the background when compared to our endless expanses of virgin forests and millions of 
acres of growing tree farms.”59 Dunn explained that the timber and wood products industries 
accounted for more than the farming, fishing, tourist, and manufacturing interests combined. 
Clearly, for Dunn, KOG's primary purpose was to prevent forest fires for the sake of private 
industry.  
These campaigns sought to engender sympathy towards the loss that came with forest 
fires. Radio advertisements declared: “forests mean wealth to Oregon. Nearly 76,000 persons are 
employed in lumbering, paper-making, and other forest industries in our state. Forest fires can 
destroy those payrolls. Keep Oregon Green and you can keep Oregon prosperous,”60 and 
“somewhere tonight, there are men without jobs because someone burned a forest.”61 These 
examples show that forests were intimately tied to economic growth and development and that 
fires only served to impede that growth. The Story of Forests, a booklet sponsored by Keep 
America Green and American Forest Products Industries Inc., contained an image of a scorched 
sapling with the caption, “fire killed this little tree…Had this tree lived, it might have provided 
the wood for lumber, paper, or other useful forest products.”62 This quote uses both an appeal to 
pristine and vulnerable wilderness with the image of the sapling and an appeal to utilitarianism to 
convince the public of the danger of fire.   
 The post-war discourse, while protecting the interests of private capital, created an 
impression of egalitarianism, reminiscent of Pinchot’s ideology. It emphasized the fact that 
forests were “ours,” and publicly owned. Arthur Priaulx, who represented the West Coast 
Lumberman’s Association on the KOG board of trustees, explained the reasoning behind this and 
                                                 
57 Unknown author, “History of Keep America Green,” Folder: History of Keep Green. KOG at 
UO, Box 1. Because the author wrote, “Keep America Green,” it is more likely they were 
associated with AFPI than KOG or KWG. 
58 Keep Oregon Green Association, “Shorts, fills, and Spot Announcements,” n.d. KOG Records 
at UO, Box 1.  
59 Paul Dunn, “Letter from Paul Dunn to Earl Newbry,” 16 March 1949. KOG Records at OSU.  
60 Albert Wiesendanger, “Radio Spot Announcement,” 22 May 1951. KOG Records at OSU.  
61 Ibid.   
62 American Forest Products Industries Inc., Story of Forests, KOG Records at UO, Box 1.    
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the semantic importance of “‘our’ forests”: “people only protect things they love or have value to 
them. Our forest must be protected. Our forests are something to cherish, to admire as things of 
beauty, to maintain as sources of employment, to keep growing to supply timber, pulp, plywood 
and other needs of man.”63 Priaulx’s appeal to common ownership juxtaposes the last statement 
that places private industry as the primary benefit of forests. Smokey Bear, appearing in CFFP 
posters, embraced a religious tone to emphasize the communal nature of forests. One poster 
exclaimed, “God gave us this,” depicting a pristine forest with a fawn in the foreground, “don’t 
give us this,” with burnt snags.64 Another commanded, “thou shalt not burn thy trees.”65  Both of 
these indicate how fire suppression advocates were framing forests as a common good. A 1963 
article appearing in the Oregon Journal posed the question, “who owns our timber?” answering, 
“in a very real sense, the people do” because the Bureau of Land Management and the USFS 
owned most of the Northwest's timberland. The author went on to write, “this responsibility [to 
protect forests from fires] goes beyond the publicly owned lands. The public has a stake in the 
protection of those millions of acres in private ownership.”66 This communitarianism purported 
that the public were the primary beneficiaries of forests and fire prevention. The blurred lines 
between public ownership and private utility sought to convince the public that forest fires 
victimized them and the timber industry equally.  
With fires as the enemy and the antithesis of American values, the timber and wood 
products industries became the heroes. Borrowing from the discourse developed during WWII 
that conflated forests with national security and values, the fire prevention campaigns developed 
this rhetoric into one that equally protected private industry. During the Korean War, fire 
prevention again became a matter of national defense. One ad began with a description of a US 
Fleet arriving for battle at a Korean beach. Then, “the boat that made this possible…was 
strengthened by its structural parts. Once again – in a national emergency – wood is proving 
itself our most valuable renewable resource. We must protect our forests, source of our timber 
supply. Keep Oregon Green, and you keep America strong.”67 The AFPI produced a series of 
advertisements in the mid-1950s with the intention of “teaching the public that fire prevention is 
everyone’s job,” while “promoting the sale and use of forest products.”68 One such 
advertisement celebrates the role of timber in the printing industry: “America’s great printing 
industry is one of the bulwarks of our democracy. Because trees grow, there will always be 
plenty of paper to feed the free presses,” coupled with the slogan, “prevent forest fires; keep our 
state green.”69 In conjunction with fires as the other “red menace,” these advertisements would 
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suggest that the battle between forest fires and the timber industry was a battle between 
communism and democracy.    
 Additionally, the press would celebrate private foresters’ timber salvaging efforts as an 
act of heroism. In this period, it was common for private foresters to “salvage” for commercial 
purposes timber damaged, or “killed” by fires. In a 1961 press release from the USFS, Walter 
Lund, the USFS official in charge of timber management in the Northwest declared, “the 
cooperation of the forest products industry to help accomplish the early removal of damaged 
material has been excellent.”70 They harvested 97 million board feet of timber from the burnt 
area, and the USFS constructed roads to aid the salvaging process and replanting of trees—roads 
that could later be used again later for harvesting timber. Thus, the portrayal of the timber 
industry as the hero produced real economic benefits for private foresters. Further, there is no 
mention of how the salvaging process benefited forests or the USFS. With timber as the victim 
of the vilified forest fires, an act that aided timber was intrinsically good.71  
 These salvage operations became so popular that they occurred in preparation for a fire. 
In fall of 1962, Hurricane Freida, also known as the Columbus Day Storm, swept through the 
Northwest with winds at 170 miles per hour, eventually killing forty individuals. The hurricane 
affected 4.9 million acres of forest in Washington State alone. In some areas, trees piled up to 
thirty feet high blocking access roads and trails. Foresters in Oregon and Washington were 
concerned the potential hazard this posed for the fire season of 1963. By then, most of the trees 
and logs would dry out, creating large amounts of fuel throughout the Northwest. They called 
this fuel “red slash,” after the red pine needles from the dried out fallen trees. KWG described 
the suppression tactics as militaristic: “Fire fighting ground forces are being mobilized by the 
State of Washington Department of Natural Resources, U.S. Forest Service, and the Washington 
Forest Protection Association through its industrial sponsors.”72 KOG and KWG sponsored a 
conference in July 1963 to plan how they would prevent an uncontrollable fire season. They used 
every tactic in their means to warn of the coming peril including television slots, posters, and 
press releases. The press release on the July conference had the headline, “Potential Forest 
Holocaust Cited at 2-State Forestry Conference.”73 In addition to the adoption of the fire villain 
discourse with the sensational headline, the article described the amount of timber in the red 
slash as 9 to 10 billion board feet in Oregon. In Washington, the figure reported was “$130 
million in stumpage and $800 million as lumber and manufactured by-products.”74 Once again, 
the timber industry was the hero against the peril of fire, “salvaging” the “commercial-sized 
logs,” throughout the states’ forests.75   
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 Two years before Hurricane Freida in 1961, Cowan had published his book, The Enemy 
is Fire! The history of the fire-enemy narrative—embedded in a broader context of fire 
suppression, forest regulation, and timber capitalism—explains the historical situation that 
prompted Cowan to recall the development of fire policy in the Northwest. The exclamatory 
punctuation reads not only as an enthusiastic assertion, but also as a desperate insistence that fire 
is the enemy rather than the timber industry. Instead, as Cowan and the fire enemy narrative 
insist, private foresters were the heroes and saviors of the pristine and economic forests. Fire was 
the “other” not only to forests, but to American values. Likewise, the discourse emerging after 
the war asserted the importance of the timber and wood products industries claiming a natural 
right to exist within the forests.  Thus, in the postwar discourse, the timber industry emerged as 
the hero in the fight against fire. This hero-victim complex sought to absolve private industry of 
any culpability in causing fires or destroying forests. In conjunction with the environmental 
othering that represented forests as ultimately fire-exclusive environments, this discourse 
established that the extraction of timber and utilitarian view of forests served to maintain the 
natural state of forests.  
Given the history of fire prevention propaganda that produced a narrative that protected, 
above all else, the capitalist interests of the timber industry, the insufficiency in the 
contemporary Smokey Bear discourse is abundantly evident. I return to the initial claim of this 
paper of the importance for environmental historians to consider the historical and environmental 
narratives embedded in contemporary discourse. The environmental narrative suggests that the 
state, and in particular the USFS acted autonomously, and only out of a lack of a better idea of 
what to do. However, the timber industry heavily influenced the regulation and goals of the 
Forest Service often to protect their interests.76  
Secondly, the contemporary discourse presents a history of discourse itself whereby 
Smokey, representing the USFS, was the only piece in the history of fire prevention campaigns. 
This view overshadows other processes as fire prevention campaigns often coupled the fire with 
a racial other such as the Paiute or Japanese. Further, the discourse established that the timber 
industry, rather than an additional other, was naturally part of the forests in a hero-victim 
complex that saw it both as the victim to fires and the savior of forests. Instead, an account of the 
history of fire and forest management in America should include the intimate role of the timber 
and wood products industries and the discourse that contributes to policy.  
 The history of the development of fire-enemy discourse that equally portrayed private 
industry as both the hero and victim demonstrates the importance of the characters in 
understanding the agenda and impact of environmental narratives. Already, works on 
environmental narratives highlight the characters that the narratives create. Diana Davis in 
Resurrecting the Granaries of Rome uncovers the vilification of indigenous herders in the 
nineteenth and twentieth-century French colonizers’ environmental narrative of desertification 
and deforestation.77 Carey, in “The History of Ice: How Glaciers Became an Endangered 
Species,” examines the environmental narrative around retreating glaciers and global financial 
institutions have created victims of the indigenous peoples affected by deglaciation.78 
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Environmental historians should continue to examine the ways in which narrative and discourse 
develop and perpetuate relations of power, oppression, and marginalization. Upon observing 
sources of propaganda and rhetoric, one should ask, who are the victims, the heroes, and the 
villains here, and to what purpose? Such framings and depictions ultimately structure who gets to 
speak for nature, to manage natural resources, and to construct human-environmental dynamics 
more broadly. Moreover, it is vital to uncover the historical narratives—the stories about stories 
about nature—concealed in contemporary discourses. Remember, only you can expose the role 







Figure 1. Udo J. Keppler's 1909 depiction of a muscular Gifford Pinchot rushing in alone to fight 
the fire representing “greed” in the form of timber grabs, land grafts. The caption reads “Who’ll 
stand by him? The Chief Forester and the consuming element.” The image appeared in the 1909 
Puck Magazine. Credit: Udo J. Keppler, Who'll stand by him? / Keppler. N.Y.: Published by 
Keppler & Schwarzmann, Puck Building, 1909. Image. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/2011647504/. (Accessed June 14, 2016.) 
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 Figure 2 – Caption reads: “Watch that campfire. 
Every forest fire is an Axis fire. Always build your campfire in a designated place where it will 
not spread and BE SURE it is completely out before leaving it—even for a short time.” Image is 
part of a series of similar ads associating fire with the Axis and encouraging the layman to 
prevent fire. Credit: Keep Oregon Green Association, "Watch That Campfire," Heppner Gazette 
Times, 2 July  1942. Retrieved from Oregon Historical Newspapers. (Accessed 28 February 
2016).79 
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 Figure 3 – Title reads: “Forest 
Defense is National Defense.” The bottom of the image provides examples of how civilians 
could help prevent fires. Credit: Unknown artist, "Forest Defense is National Defense," World 
War II Poster Collection,  (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Libraries Special 






 Figure 4 Caption reads: “Our 
Carelessness - Their Secret Weapon – Prevent Forest Fires.” “U.S. Forest Service” appears in the 
bottom left corner. This image is one of the most iconic fire prevention posters of the era. Credit: 
Unknown artist, "Our Carelessness - Their Secret Weapon," World War II Poster Collection,  
(Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Libraries Special Collections & Archives Research 
Center). 80 
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(Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Libraries Special Collections & Archives Research 
Center).  
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 Figure 5 Caption reads: 
“Careless Matches—Weapons of Sabotage…Prevent Forest Fires.” The figures from Figure 4 
appear in the bottom right corner suggesting that the Figure 4 poster would be widely 
recognizable. Credit: Unknown artist, "Careless Matches—Weapons of Sabotage," World War II 
Poster Collection,  (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Libraries Special Collections & 
Archives Research Center).81 
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Figure 6 Caption reads: 
Careless matches aid the Axis – Prevent Forest Fires!” Appeared in newspaper ads without 
credit. Credit: “Careless Matches Aid the Axis,” Heppner Gazette Times, 6 August 1942. 
Retrieved from Oregon Historical Newspapers. Accessed 28 February 2016.82  
  
                                                 
82 “Careless Matches Aid the Axis,” Heppner Gazette Times, 6 August 1942. Retrieved from 




Figure 7 Caption reads: “Stop and get your free fag bag – careless matches aid the Axis.” The 
USFS logo appears above the word “Axis.” Credit: Louis Hirshman, Stop and Get Your Free 
Fag Bag Careless Matches Aid the Axis., [Pennsylvania: wpa war services project, between 1941 
and 1943]  
Retrieved from Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3b49005/. (Accessed 15 
March 2016). 83 
 
 
                                                 
83 Louis Hirshman, Stop and Get Your Free Fag Bag Careless Matches Aid the Axis., 
[Pennsylvania: wpa war services project, between 1941 and 1943]  
Retrieved from Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3b49005/. (Accessed 15 
March 2016).  
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Figure 8.  Caption reads: “One Red Menace You Can Control.” Credit: American Forest Products 
Industries Inc., “One Red Menace You Can Control,” Heppner Gazette Times, 13 August 1950. 
Retrieved from Oregon Digital. (Accessed 15 March 2016). The draft of the ad appears in: These 





                                                 
84 American Forest Products Industries Inc., “One Red Menace You Can Control,” These Free Ad 
Mats Can Help Keep Your State Green, booklet, KOG Records at UO, Box 1. 
